Misrepresenting private information is often costly, for technological, legal, or psychological reasons. I develop a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS), but with a convex cost of lying or misreporting. There are three main results.
Introduction
The seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter, CS) on strategic information transmission though "cheap talk" or costless signaling has been widely applied to problems in bargaining, monetary policy, political economy, and other areas. The basic setting is a one-shot game where an informed party, the Sender (he), communicates his one-dimensional private information to an uninformed decision-maker, the Receiver (she).
Costless misrepresentation of private information is one extreme in a continuum of possibilities. At the other extreme, one could posit that agents are either unable to manipulate information or are committed to truth-telling. Plainly, this would eliminate strategic considerations altogether. Evidence suggests that reality typically lies somewhere in between: individuals can and do misrepresent private information, but bear some cost in doing so. There are various reasons why such misrepresentation-synonymously, lying or misreporting-can be costly. First, there may be costs of falsifying a state of the world, such as when a manager has to spend time "cooking the numbers" to report higher profits, or more generally forego other economic opportunities in order to report non-truthfully (e.g. Lacker and Weinberg, 1989) . Second, there may be probabilistic ex-post state verification resulting in direct penalties or adverse reputation effects if an agent is caught misreporting, such as a taxpayer running the risk of a random audit (e.g. Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) . Third, a recent body of experimental work documents that people appear to have psychological or moral aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2006) . 1 This paper studies strategic information transmission with costly misreporting instead of, or in addition to, cheap talk. Specifically, the model is that of CS with one critical difference: when a Sender of type t, a one-dimensional variable that represents his private information, sends a one-dimensional signal or report r to the Receiver, he bears a cost kC (r, t) , where C(r, t) is a misreporting cost function and k is a scalar that parameterizes its magnitude. The case of k = 0 corresponds to pure cheap talk, analyzed by CS; this paper studies "costly talk ", k > 0. I make two assumptions on the cost function C(r, t): (i) for any type of the Sender, lying is increasingly costly the further a report is from the type's cost-minimizing report (while it is natural to think of truth-telling, r = t, as minimizing cost, this is not necessary); (ii) the cost-minimizing report is increasing in the Sender's type, as is certainly the case when truth is cost-minimizing. Although the model permits various interpretations of what the costly reports are, it is convenient to think of these signals as being submitted evidence or literal statements about the Sender's type in commonly understood language.
The model is one of discriminatory signaling in the tradition following Spence (1973) , but it converges to the cheap talk model of CS as the magnitude of cost k → 0. A notorious problem with the analysis of cheap talk is that of multiple equilibria. In particular, the CS model generally possesses a range of equilibria that can be ranked in terms of their "informativeness", measured by the Receiver's ex-ante utility. At one end of the spectrum is a "most-informative" equilibrium that may convey significant amounts of information; at the other is the completely uninformative, "babbling" equilibrium. Unfortunately, there is no well-established criterion for selecting amongst these. 2 Though CS is a signaling game, standard theory for equilibrium selection in signaling games (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987) does not apply precisely because the signals are completely costless to the Sender. 3 While there have been alternative refinements developed specifically for cheap talk games, these have been only partially successful in general, and particularly unsuccessful when applied to CS. Notably, except in trivial cases, there is no CS equilibrium that survives criteria like neologism-proofness (Farrell, 1993) or announcementproofness (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite, 1991) ; whereas all CS equilibria can survive credible rationalizability (Rabin, 1990 ). 4 The model proposed here permits a new perspective on this issue. If communication does typically possess a dimension with misreporting costs, then CS is best thought of as an approximation to a setting where these costs are small. Hence, I refer to the case of k ≈ 0 as "almost-cheap talk ". The obvious question then is: which cheap talk equilibria are limits of equilibria with misreporting costs as k → 0? Throughout my analysis, I focus on a natural subset of (perfect Bayesian) equilibria-monotone equilibria-where the Sender's report is increasing in his type and the Receiver's beliefs about the Sender's type are increasing, in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, in the observed report. 5 2 The applied literature typically focuses on the most-informative equilibrium. The justification usually given is that this is the ex-ante Pareto dominant equilibrium under some conditions, hence the one that players should be expected to coordinate on. Aside from any general concerns, there are at least two reasons why this justification is not very satisfactory in CS. First, it is necessarily the case that different Sender types have different preferences over equilibria with different outcomes. In particular, there is always a type whose most-preferred equilibrium outcome is the uninformative one. Second, since CS is a signaling game, simply invoking the ex-ante Pareto criterion is troubling because in other widely applied signaling games, e.g. Spence (1973) , relatively uncontroversial refinements such as the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) can select equilibria that are Pareto (a fortiori, ex-ante Pareto) dominated.
3 These equilibrium refinements are based on Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) notion of strategic stability, and operate through dominance arguments applied to out-of-equilibrium signals. Since any cheap talk outcome can be supported by an equilibrium where all messages are sent on the equilibrium path, they have no power in cheap talk games.
4 This also applies to general perturbation methods studied by Blume (1994) when the message space is large. Evolutionary arguments such as those in Blume, Kim, and Sobel (1993) have only limited power as well, although they do rule out uninformative outcomes in some cases.
5 Signaling games can often support implausible equilibria through the manipulation of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. Monotone equilibria are appealing in the current model because higher types have an intrinsic preference for higher signals (the cost-minimizing report is increasing in type and costs are convex), and if signals and thus Section 3 establishes a necessary condition for any CS equilibrium to be the limit of monotone almost-cheap talk equilibria. The condition is easy to check, and is called NITS, for no incentive to separate: does the lowest type weakly prefer the action it elicits in the CS equilibrium to the action it would obtain by revealing its type, or equivalently the action it would elicit in the complete-information game? Under a mild technical assumption, I also prove the converse: any CS equilibrium satisfying NITS is the limit of a sequence of monotone equilibria of my model as the misreporting cost shrinks to 0. These results can be interpreted as providing a rationale for focussing on CS equilibria that satisfy NITS. In a companion paper, Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2007) show that NITS is a powerful criterion to select amongst CS equilibria: there is at least one CS equilibrium that satisfies NITS, and under a regularity condition (Condition M of CS), only the most-informative CS equilibrium satisfies NITS. To this extent, my analysis provides a novel argument for selecting the most-informative CS equilibrium in commonly used specifications.
In Section 4, I augment the model by allowing the Sender to send two kinds of signals: as before, a report which entails a convex cost of lying; and a pure cheap talk message, which is costless. The costless message may be viewed as either a purely technical device to analyze the cheap talk extension of the costly lying model (as proposed by Manelli, 1996) , or alternatively, as representing a substantive economic notion that costless signals are also available to the Sender (analagous to Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000) . Adding the costless messages does not affect any of the convergence analysis discussed above-the results of Section 3 carry over without changebut their presence allows me to analyze a class of equilibria with appealing properties. Specifically, I focus on a subset of monotone equilibria that satisfy a strong forward-induction requirement, the monotone D1 (mD1) criterion proposed by Bernheim and Severinov (2003) . 6 I prove existence and provide a complete characterization of mD1 equilibria in the current framework, for arbitrary costs of misreporting. In an mD1 equilibrium, there is an interval of fully separating types at the bottom end of of the type space, each of who uses a distinct costly report, while all types above some cutoff type pool on the highest available costly report. Nonetheless, above the cutoff type, there may be further segmentation using the cheap talk messages, similar to CS. This characterization leads the final result of the paper: under the regularity condition mentioned before, Condition M of CS, any CS equilibrium satisfying NITS is the limit of a sequence of mD1 equilibria as k → 0.
Aside from the limit results on cheap talk equilibrium selection, the model proposed here is interesting away from the limit as well, as discussed in Section 5. A pure cheap talk framework beliefs are monotone on the equilibrium path, it would be perverse to have non-monotone beliefs off the equilibrium path. In fact, the formal analysis only requires an even weaker notion of belief monotonicity off the equilibrium path.
6 The mD1 criterion is similar in spirit to but more restrictive than the widely used D1 or divinity criteria of Cho and Kreps (1987) and Banks and Sobel (1987) , which generally do not have much power in the present setting.
is not suited to understand issues of language: the equilibrium relationship between messages and types. In particular, the CS model is silent on the phenomenon of "inflated language" or exaggeration, viz. the use of language that deviates from literal truth in the direction of the Sender's bias. Such a phenomenon is prevalent in many real-world situations of strategic information transmission, such as recommendation letters, advertising, earnings reports from firms, and stock recommendations. 7 Treating communication as costly talk rather than cheap talk is quite natural in these situations, for the reasons previously mentioned. The current model naturally generates inflated language in equilibrium. Moreover, the mD1 equilibria I study predict that as the magnitude of misreporting cost shrinks, the degree of report inflation in equilibrium weakly rises (strictly so, if the magnitude is not already too close to 0). This is an intuitive result that has no counterpart in a standard cheap talk framework. This paper makes contributions to both costly signaling and cheap talk literatures, and especially their intersection. The remainder of this Introduction discusses in some detail other recent research at this intersection and their relationship to my work. Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) also study the notion of costly talk and language inflation.
Related Literature
However, the focus and analysis is quite different, because we study there an unbounded type and message space setting. Our results in that paper concern the existence of separating equilibria for arbitrarily small communication costs, which relies on unboundedness. Here, I study the canonical bounded type space version of CS, with a bounded message space, and I show that separating equilibria do not exist when costs are sufficiently small. Consequently, the attention here is necessarily on partially-pooling equilibria. Moreover, questions of equilibrium convergence as costs shrink to 0 and selection of CS equilibria do not arise in Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007). 8 In a bounded type and message space model, Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) study the "uniform-quadratic" case of CS where the prior on types is uniform and utility functions take quadratic loss form. They posit that the receiver may be naive or non-strategic with some probability. This transforms the game from one of pure cheap talk into a costly signaling structure that can be subsumed by my framework here (see Section 5). For some parameterizations, they construct equilibria that have similar features to the mD1 equilibria here: separation at the low end of the type space and pooling at the top, with language being inflated. Their construction does not require the cheap talk extension that I use in Section 4. However, their parametric restrictions do not permit the probability of the receiver being naive-isomorphically, the cost of misreporting-to be close to 0; hence they have no analog to my analysis in Section 3. Instead, they perform some other comparative statics, and they show that as the type space grows, holding the probability of naivety constant, their equilibrium converges to the separating equilibrium of Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) . Chen (2006) furthers the non-strategic approach by allowing not only the Receiver to be naive, but also the Sender. Specifically, with some probability the Sender just reports his type truthfully, and with some independent probability the Receiver interprets the report as being truthful. As with Squintani (2006), Chen (2006) studies the uniform-quadratic case of CS. She shows that there is a unique equilibrium in the cheap talk extension of her model when required to satisfy a monotonicity property. The equilibrium converges to the mostinformative equilibrium of the uniform-quadratic CS model when the probabilities of naivety of both Sender and Receiver are taken to 0. This parallels the selection here of CS equilibria that satisfy NITS when costs of lying shrink to 0, since the only CS equilibrium satisfying NITS in the uniform-quadratic case is the most-informative one. 9
As mentioned earlier, Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2007) discuss in detail the NITS property, proving results about which CS equilibria satisfy this property, and providing some justifications for it beyond the perturbation arguments of Chen (2006) and the current paper. They also demonstrate that NITS is useful in one-dimensional cheap talk models aside from CS.
With regards to the broader signaling literature, I use techniques developed by Mailath (1987) to study separation through signaling with a continuum of types. Whereas his analysis concerns fully separating equilibria, the main results in this paper concern partially-pooling equilibria, as already noted. Cho and Sobel (1990) were the first to derive incomplete separation in the manner obtained here: pooling at the top of the type space and separation at the bottom with respect to the costly signal. Their analysis is for a class of signaling games that have a finite type space and satisfy a single-crossing property that does not apply in this paper. A more closely related model is that of Bernheim and Severinov (2003) . While theirs is a specific application 9 A strength of Chen's (2006) approach with Sender naivety is that it ensures that all reports are on the equilibrium path, pinning down Receiver beliefs, and obviating the need to analyze off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. The choice of how to specify Sender naivety plays an important role, however, since it imposes particular restrictions on Receiver beliefs when a report is observed that is not sent by a strategic Sender. In effect, the specification of Sender naivety substitutes for restrictions on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs in a fully rational model. Moreover, the flexibility with off-path beliefs in the current model allows me to prove existence of monotone equilibria when the perturbation from CS is small without resorting to the cheap talk extension.
to public finance, the formal structures share many properties. As previously mentioned, they
introduced the mD1 refinement; my analysis of such equilibria owes much to them, though there are important differences both in the characterization itself and the proof. Moreover, their focus is not on convergence as the cost of signaling shrinks to 0; in particular, the analysis here in Section 3 has no analog in their work.
Finally, I should also mention two other connections: first, there is a small literature on mechanism design with communication costs, e.g. Deneckere and Severinov (2003) . The underlying motivation of costly misreporting of private information is similar to that of this paper; the issues addressed are very distinct. Second, there is a literature in Accounting that models signaling explanations for "earnings management", e.g. Stein (1989) . These papers also motivate costly misreporting, but to my knowledge only consider unbounded type spaces and special functional forms.
Preliminaries

Model
There are two players, a Sender (S) and a Receiver (R). The Sender has private information summarized by his type t ∈ T ≡ [0, 1], which is drawn from a differentiable probability distribution F (t), with strictly positive density for all t ∈ T . After privately observing his type t, the Sender sends the Receiver a one-dimensional report, r, about his type. The report r lies in a nondegenerate compact interval, which for convenience is assumed to be the same as the type space, [0, 1] . 10 After observing the report, R takes an action, a ∈ R. The payoff for R is given by V (a, t), and the payoff for S is given by U (a, t) − kC (r, t), where C (r, t) is a misreporting cost function and k > 0 is a scalar that parameterizes the intensity of misreporting cost. This formulation entails that r is payoff-relevant only for S. All aspects of the game except the value of t are common knowledge.
Throughout, the following assumptions on payoffs are maintained. The functions U (a, t) and V (a, t) are twice continuously differentiable on R × T . 11 Using subscripts to denote derivatives, U 11 < 0 < U 12 and V 11 < 0 < V 12 , so that payoffs are concave in R's action and supermodular. For any t, there exists a R (t) and a S (t) respectively such that V 1 a R (t) , t = U 1 a S (t) , t = 0, with a S (t) > a R (t). That is, the most-preferred actions are well-defined for both players, and the Sender prefers higher actions than the Receiver. These assumptions on U and V imply that for i ∈ {R, S}, a i 1 (t) > 0, i.e. both players prefer higher actions when the Sender's type is higher. Finally, C (r, t) is twice continuously differentiable on T × T , with C 11 > 0 > C 12 , and for all t there exists r S (t) ∈ [0, 1] such that C 1 (r S (t), t) = 0. That is, r S (t) is the cost-minimizing report for type t, higher types have higher cost-minimizing reports, and for any type, the marginal cost of misreporting is increasing as the report gets further away from its cost-minimizing report. (It is helpful to keep in mind the special case when C 1 (t, t) = 0 for all t ∈ T , in which case the cheapest report for any type is the truth, i.e. r S (t) = t.)
A few aspects of this simple model are worth emphasizing. First, for all k > 0, the report r is a discriminatory signal, in the sense that the cost varies with type, rather than cheap talk or money-burning (both which are non-discriminatory). Second, if k = 0, the report is pure cheap talk and the model is exactly that of CS. Third, the upper bound on the report space plays a crucial role in the equilibrium convergence results as k → 0 because it ensures that regardless of how small k is, the function kC(r, t) is bounded and has bounded derivatives (given the smoothness assumptions). An alternative that would also deliver the ensuing results would be to allow for an unbounded report space, but place appropriate bounds on the cost function.
Lastly, it may be realistic in some situations to permit the Sender access to not only the costly report I have modeled so far, but also an additional costless signal. 12 While I introduce this explicitly in Section 4, I have chosen to keep the model simple at the outset, because adding this does not affect the first part of the analysis at all, but does complicate notation.
Pure Cheap Talk
It is useful to recall some of the main results of CS at this stage. Abusing notation, for any t < t , let a R (t , t ) ≡ arg max t t V (a, t) dF (t) be the optimal action for the Receiver if the only information she has is that the Sender's type lies in [t , t ] . CS studied the case where the report sent by the Sender is pure cheap talk, i.e. k = 0. In that setting, they proved that each (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium is characterized by a finite partition of the type space, t 0 ≡ 0, t 1 , . . . , t N ≡ 1 , where t j > t j−1 for all j = 1, . . . , N , 13 and the following "arbitrage" condition holds:
In equilibrium, information transmission is coarse: the Sender conveys which element of 12 For example, firms can take costly actions to manipulate earnings, but also make cheap talk statements to the press with explanations for why earnings may be unexpectedly low.
13 Note that the restriction to a strictly increasing sequence is without any essential loss of generality, because the only other possibility for a CS equilibrium partition is one where 0 = t 0 = t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t N = 1 . Such an equilibrium partition is essentially equivalent to one where type 0 does not separate, because the prior distribution on types puts 0 probability on any particular type.
the partition his type lies in, and the Receiver optimally responds to this information, so that a type t ∈ (t j , t j+1 ) sends a message that leads to action a R (t j , t j+1 ). The arbitrage condition (A) says that a boundary type, t j , that divides two segments of the partition must be indifferent between the actions associated with each of these segments. The arbitrage condition (A) combined with the initial and final conditions t 0 ≡ 0 and t N ≡ 1 defines a 2 nd order difference equation.
There will in general exist multiple solutions, and thus multiple equilibrium outcomes; this is particularly severe when the preferences of both players are relatively congruent. CS proved that there is a finite upper bound N ≥ 1 on the maximum number of steps in a solution, and moreover, for each N ∈ {1, . . . , N }, there is an N -step equilibrium.
An important regularity condition of CS (p. 1444) will play a role at points of this paper.
Say that a sequence t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t J is a forward solution to (A) if t 1 > t 0 and for all j = 1, . . . , J −1, 
Monotone Equilibrium
Return now to the current model, where k > 0. As noted earlier, this transforms the game from one of pure cheap talk to one where signaling is costly and discriminatory across types. The basic solution concept I employ is (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 14 The Sender's (pure) strategy is a Borel-measurable function ρ : [0, 1] → [0, 1], where ρ(t) is the report sent by type t. Denote the posterior beliefs of the Receiver given a report r by the cumulative distribution G (t | r). The Receiver's (pure) strategy is a Borel-measurable function α : [0, 1] → R, so that α(r) is the action taken when report r is observed. Equilibrium requires the Sender to be playing optimally given the Receiver's strategy, and that the Receiver play optimally given his beliefs, which must satisfy Bayes rule where possible. 15 As is well known, signaling games often possess a plethora of equilibria, many of which can be implausible. I restrict attention to equilibria that display some natural monotonicity. Report monotonicity says if t > t, then the report sent by t is no smaller than the report sent by t. Given report monotonicity, Bayes rule implies that R's beliefs upon seeing a report, r, first order stochastically dominates (FOSD) her beliefs upon seeing a report r < r, whenever r and r are both on the equilibrium path. That is, report monotonicity implies that R's beliefs are weakly monotone in the sense of FOSD on the equilibrium path. By the assumptions on V (·, ·), optimality of the Receiver's strategy requires that weakly higher beliefs in the sense of FOSD imply weakly higher actions. (The argument is standard: by FOSD and supermodularity, V 1 (a, t) dG (t|r) is increasing in r. Therefore, V (a, t) dG (t|r) has increasing differences in a, t. By Topkis' Theorem, the maximizers of V (a, t) dG (t|r) are non-decreasing in r.) It thus follows that α(r) is non-decreasing on the equilibrium path. The belief monotonicity condition extends this to off -the-equilibrium-path reports as well.
Let me now discuss why the restriction to monotone equilibria is appealing. First consider report monotonicity. In traditional signaling games (as defined in Cho and Sobel, 1990) , all equilibria necessarily feature report monotonicity. This follows from two usual assumptions:
first, that irrespective of his true type, the Sender's payoff is increasing in his perceived type; second, a single crossing condition holds such that for any two types, indifference curves in a − r space only cross once, if at all. My model generally violates both of these properties: the former because of the CS preferences over actions and types, i.e. the assumptions on U and V ; the latter because of these assumptions combined with the assumptions on C. 16 This is what opens the possibility of constructing equilibria that violate report monotonicity. However, any such equilibrium-if one exists-seems implausible relative to a report monotone equilibrium, because higher types intrinsically prefer higher reports in this model (r S (t) is strictly increasing and C (·, t) is convex around r S (t)).
15 To be precise, G(t|r) must be a regular conditional distribution of t given r, derived from ρ and F . 16 Specifically, indifference curves in a − r space generally cross either twice or never in the current model. This is the main property shared with Bernheim and Severinov (2003) .
As already noted, report monotonicity implies that the Receiver's beliefs must be monotone (in the sense of FOSD) on the equilibrium path. So the requirement of belief monotonicity is only further restrictive off the equilibrium path. Given monotone beliefs on the equilibrium path, non-monotonicities in beliefs off the path would seem perverse. Moreover, as will be made precise in Section 3, my results only require a weaker condition, viz. that beliefs for an off-path report be "in between" the highest belief held for some lower on-path report and the lowest belief held for some higher on-path report. An equilibrium where this property is violated uses extremely elaborate beliefs, making it unattractive.
Finally, it is important to note that the restriction to monotone equilibria is without any essential loss of generality in the case of pure cheap talk, in the sense that every CS equilibrium mapping from T to A can be generated by a monotone equilibrium when k = 0.
Almost-Cheap Talk
This section deals with the convergence of monotone equilibria as k → 0. While it is not possible to give a complete characterization of all monotone equilibria, enough can be said about their structure for small k to obtain a necessary condition that any limit CS equilibrium must satisfy (Theorem 1). I then show that under a technical assumption, this condition is also sufficient, simultaneous proving the existence of monotone equilibria when k is small (Theorem 2). Some terminology will be useful. With respect to a (generally implicit) strategy profile, (ρ, α), say that a typet elicits or induces action a if α ρ t = a;t is separating if there exists some reportr such that {t : ρ (t) =r} = {t}; and a set of types are pooling if they all send the same report. Report monotonicity has a basic implication about elicited actions.
Lemma 1. In any monotone equilibrium, the set of types that elicit the same action is convex.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for some t 1 < t 2 < t 3 , both t 1 and t 3 elicit action a 1 , whereas t 2 elicits a 2 (a 2 = a 1 ). By report monotonicity, α (ρ(t 1 )) < a R (t 2 ), and also α (ρ(t 3 )) > a R (t 2 ).
This contradicts both t 1 and t 3 eliciting a 1 .
Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 implies that for any monotone equilibrium, there is a unique partition of the type space, t 0 ≡ 0, t 1 , . . . , t J ≡ 1 (where with some abuse of notation, J ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∞}) that satisfies all three of the following properties: (i) for all j < J, t j < t j+1 ; (ii) within the interior of any element of the partition, (t j , t j+1 ), either all types pool and elicit a R (t j , t j+1 ), or all types separate and each elicits a R (t); (iii) if (t j , t j+1 ) is a separating interval of types, then (t j−1 , t j ) and (t j+1 , t j+2 ) are pooling intervals (when they exist). Note that CS partitions also satisfy these properties, in part vacuously. In comparison with CS, however, the monotone equilibrium partitions for k > 0 may differ in two ways: first, they need not be finite; second, types within an element of the partition may be separating.
Definition 2. A mapping, β : [0, 1] → R, is a (monotone) outcome if there exists a (monotone) equilibrium, (ρ, α), such that β = α • ρ. β is said to be supported by (ρ, α).
By Lemma 1, any monotone outcome is associated with a partition of the type space.
While an outcome in this sense disregards the payoff-relevant reports used by each type, it is a convenient way to frame convergence of equilibria as k → 0, since the payoff impact of reports vanishes. Analogously, a CS outcome is an outcome supported by a CS equilibrium.
The following Lemma severely restricts the set of monotone outcomes when k is small.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for the first part stems from the fact that if a monotone equilibrium has a typet > 0 separating, then as a consequence of Lemma 1, a type t <t cannot be eliciting an action greater than a R (t,t). But then, when k is small enough,t cannot be separating, because some t <t would deviate and mimict. For the second part, note that for there to be an infinite number of actions elicited by types above ε, it would have to be that amongst the set of types above ε, there are arbitrarily small convex pools. This implies that there must be some type t > ε who is eliciting an action arbitrarily close to a R (t), i.e. be close to separating. This cannot obtain when k is small enough for the same reason as the first part of the Lemma. Finally, part (iii) is established by showing that given the earlier arguments, the incentive constraints for types above ε imposes conditions that are arbitrarily close to the CS arbitrage conditions (A)
as k is made arbitrarily small. This is because each of the boundary types between successive pools in [ε, 1] must be indifferent between joining its two adjacent pools; when k is small, this is approximately the same condition as the CS arbitrage condition.
Combined, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that any monotone equilibrium with almost-cheap talk (i.e. small k) consists of a finite sequence of connected non-degenerate pools for all both a vanishing measure of the lowest types. In particular, it is an immediate corollary that there cannot be full separation once k is sufficiently small. 17
To state the main results, one more definition is needed.
Definition 3. A CS equilibrium with partition,
. It satisfies NITS strictly if the inequality is strict. A CS outcome has or satisfies the NITS property (strictly) if it is supported by a CS equilibrium that satisfies NITS (strictly).
In words, a CS equilibrium satisfies NITS if and only if the lowest type weakly prefers the action it elicits in the cheap talk equilibrium to the action it would elicit by separating itself (if it could) at no cost. The ensuing theorem says that only CS outcomes satisfying NITS can be limits of monotone almost-cheap talk outcomes.
a.e., where β 0 is a CS outcome that satisfies NITS.
Because the logic of the proof is central and instructive, a detailed sketch is included in the text.
Proof Sketch. Fix a sequence of monotone outcomes, β k →β in measure as k → 0, and for each β k , let the supporting equilibrium be (ρ k , α k ) with (possibly infinite) partition
It is straightforward that there exists a unique CS outcome, β 0 , such thatβ = β 0 a.e.
(existence follows from Lemma 2 (part iii), and uniqueness follows from the fact that no two CS outcomes can be a.e. equal). Obviously, β k → β 0 in measure. I argue by contradiction that β 0 satisfies NITS. Suppose β 0 does not satisfy NITS. Let the CS equilibrium that generates β 0 have supporting partition t 0 0 = 0, t 0 1 , . . . , t 0 N = 1 , and denote the action elicited by types in
. In words, type 0 strictly prefers to elicit a R (0) than elicit a 0 1 at equal cost. The argument proceeds via four Claims outlined below; details for each are in the Appendix.
Claim 1: For all k sufficiently small, (ρ k , α k ) has no separating types. The intuition is that by Lemma 2 (part iii), for small enough k, ρ k must entail types pooling together approximately as in β 0 , except perhaps for types arbitrarily close 0. Hence, if a type is separating, it must be an eliciting an action arbitrarily close to a R (0). Since NITS is not satisfied, by continuity and small costs, some type above 0 that is eliciting an action close to a 0 1 will strictly prefer to deviate and mimic the separating type.
Therefore, for all k sufficiently small, the equilibrium (ρ k , α k ) has only pools, and its equilibrium partition must have exactly N steps. Accordingly, henceforth write the equilibrium
For the remainder of the proof, for all j = 1, . . . , N , let r k j and a k j denote the report sent and action elicited by types in interval (
Claim 2: For all k small enough, r k N ≥ r S (1). The intuition is that if not, type 1 can profitably deviate by playing r = r S (1) (which is off-path by report monotonicity) and eliciting an action a ≥ a k N (by belief monotonicity) and incurring a strictly lower cost.
Claim 3: For all k sufficiently small, r k n ≥ r S (t k n ) for all n = 1, . . . , N . This is the main step, and the argument is inductive. Take as given that r k n+1 > r S (t k n ) (Claim 2 delivers this for
, report monotonicity requires that r S (t k n ) is off the equilibrium path, and belief monotonicity requires that α(r
is a profitable deviation for type t k n because the induced action is weakly preferred to either a k n or a k n+1 (because U 11 < 0) and the report is strictly less costly than either r k n or r k n+1 .
Claim 4: For all k sufficiently small, r k 1 ≤ r S (0). The intuition is that if not, then for k small enough, r S (0) is off the equilibrium path by report monotonicity and α(r S (0)) ≤ a k 1 by belief monotonicity. For small k, since a k 1 ≈ a 0 1 , it follows that r S (0) is a profitable deviation for type 0, because the induced action is weakly preferred (since U 11 < 0 and U (a 0 1 , 0) < U (a R (0), 0) by hypothesis of NITS not being satisfied), and the report is strictly cheaper than r k 1 .
We have the desired contradiction, since Claims 3 and 4 imply that for all k sufficiently
A few remarks about the Theorem are in order.
Remark 1 (Weakening belief monotonicity). An inspection of the proof reveals that the belief monotonicity restriction in Definition 1 is stronger than necessary. Instead, all that is needed is that the action played in response to an out-of-equilibrium report, r, must be weakly higher than the highest action played in response to any on-path report r < r, and weakly lower than the lowest action played in response to any on-path report r > r. To state this formally, given
The following weak belief monotonicity is sufficient for the Theorem 1: for all (out-of-equilibrium) r,
It is straightforward to verify that belief monotonicity is strictly stronger than weak belief monotonicity; the latter allows for α to be non-monotone over an interval of out-of-equilibrium reports, whereas the former does not.
18 I follow the convention that the supremum (infimum) of an empty set is −∞ (+∞).
Remark 2 (Role of (weak) belief monotonicity). The role of [weak] belief monotonicity is illustrated in Figure 1 , where for simplicity I assume a R (t) = r S (t) = t. In the figure, the dotted curves represent indifference curves for various types; the thick (red) solid line is the Sender's strategy; and the thin (blue) solid line is the Receiver's strategy. There is a two-step CS partition,
with associated actions a 0 1 and a 0 2 . From the indifference curve of type 0, I(0), it should be clear that the CS outcome does not satisfy NITS. However, there may be a sequence of equilibrium outcomes that converge to the CS outcome (of course, they must violate monotonicity). For k = ε, the figure illustrates a potential equilibrium profile (ρ ε , α ε ) whose outcome is close to the CS outcome. Theorem 1 does not apply because α ε does not satisfy [even weak] belief monotonicity. Notice that [weak] belief monotonicity would require that for all
, in which case the outcome α ε • ρ ε cannot be supported, because type t ε 1 would have a profitable deviation to some r ≈ 1. Remark 3 (Allowing pure cheap talk). With an eye towards the sequel, let me note at this juncture that Theorem 1 and its preceding Lemmas are unchanged if the Sender is allowed to send not only the report, r, but also a pure cheap talk message, m. (Obvious modifications to notation and definitions need to be made; but the only conceptually important point is that report and belief monotonicity would continue to be defined with respect to the report, r, alone.) The logic of the proof reveals this, and the intuition is simple: the additional costless message, m, can only play a role in further segmenting the set of types that are pooled on some report; moreover, no types can fully separate using m alone.
Theorem 1 identifies NITS as a necessary condition for a CS equilibrium to be a limit of monotone outcomes of my model. Theorem 2 below asserts the converse under a mild technical condition. To state it requires some notation. For any t ∈ [0, 1], define, similar to CS,
is a partition of the type space if and only if τ K(t) (t) = 1.
To understand the assumption, first note that by the continuity of K(·) at any t such that Proof. See Appendix A.
The idea of the proof is as follows: given a CS outcome that satisfies NITS, 19 I construct an arbitrarily small perturbation of the partition and show that this perturbed partition is a monotone outcome for small enough k, supported by an equilibrium where all the equilibrium reports are close to highest available report, 1. The crucial role that NITS plays is to ensure that the unused reports at the bottom (i.e. below the report sent by type 0) can be assigned monotone beliefs that maintain equilibrium incentives. In particular, one can assign point-mass beliefs of type 0 to all such reports, so that the Receiver responds with a R (0). As in the proof of Theorem 1, if NITS is not satisfied by the CS outcome, such a construction is not feasible, because the lowest type would strictly prefer to deviate to a low report for small enough k.
How useful is the NITS criterion in pruning the set of CS equilibria? Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2007) prove the following.
Lemma 3. Every CS outcome with the maximal number of induced actions, N , satisfies NITS.
If Condition M holds, only the unique CS outcome with N induced actions satisfies NITS.
Recall that Condition M is a regularity condition that is used to perform comparative statics in CS with respect to changes in preferences; it is typically invoked in applied papers that use this framework, and in particular is satisfied by the widely used uniform-quadratic specification of CS. The following corollary of the earlier results is therefore worth stating explicitly.
Corollary 1. Assume Condition M. There is a sequence of monotone outcomes β k →β in measure as k → 0 if and only ifβ is (a.e.) the CS outcome with maximum induced actions, which is the most-informative outcome.
I end this section by highlighting a limitation of the analysis so far: it has focussed entirely on the case of almost-cheap talk, i.e. small k. On the other hand, the idea of costly talk is interesting away from the limit as well. Unfortunately, it appears infeasible to say much about the class of all monotone equilibria when k is large. The following section therefore studies a particular class of monotone equilibria, facilitated by augmenting the model. 
Cheap and Costly Talk
For the remainder of the paper, the Sender is allowed to to send a signal pair, (r, m), where r continues to be the costly report as before, but m is now a payoff-irrelevant pure cheap talk message. Note that for terminological clarity, I always refer to r as the report and m as the message. It is assumed that m ∈ M , where M is an arbitrary infinite space. The Sender's strategy henceforth consists of two components: a reporting strategy, ρ(t), and a message strategy, µ(t). The Receiver's strategy continues to be denoted α, but is now a function of two arguments, hence written as α(r, m).
The message m can be thought of as either a technical device to study the cheap talk extension of the costly misreporting model (as suggested by Manelli, 1996) , or as representing a substantive economic notion that costless signals are also available to the Sender (as in AustenSmith and Banks, 2000) . Each of these interpretations is appealing in different applications. 20
In this setting, a single report may map into multiple actions from the Receiver, depending on the accompanying message. Hence, the definition of belief monotonicity needs a modification: r, m) . With this change, the monotonicity definition for equilibrium (Definition 1) continues to apply. Note also that an outcome is now a function
It is important to emphasize that as noted in Remark 3, Theorem 1 goes through unchanged, and so does Theorem 2 because cheap talk can always be made irrelevant.
The first part of this section introduces a forward-induction refinement of monotone equilibria. The second part characterizes the class of such equilibria, and proves existence within this class. I use these results in the third part of the Section to prove prove an analog of Theorem 2 within the narrower class of forward-induction equilibria.
The Monotonic D1 Criterion
The refinement I adopt is the monotonic D1 (mD1) criterion, due to Bernheim and Severinov (2003) . The underlying idea is the same as Cho and Kreps's (1987) given profile ((ρ, µ), α), define
Suppose ((ρ, µ), α) is an equilibrium. For an out-of-equilibrium report r such that some report r < r (resp. r > r ) is sent in equilibrium, ξ l (r ) (resp. ξ h (r )) is the "highest" (resp. "lowest") action taken by the Receiver in response to an equilibrium report lower (resp. higher) than r .
If r is such that there is no report r < r (resp. r > r ) sent in equilibrium, then ξ l (r ) (resp. ξ h (r )) just specifies the lowest (resp. highest) rationalizable action for the Receiver.
With implicit respect to some profile ((ρ, µ), α), let
To interpret, consider an unused report r in some equilibrium. A(r, t) (resp. A(r, t)) is the set of responses within the set [ξ l (r), ξ h (r)] that give type t a weak (resp. strict) incentive to deviate to r. A with a R (0) , a R (1) , then the above test is like the D1 criterion (cf. Cho and Sobel, 1990, p. 385) . 21 However, given belief monotonicity, for any out-of-equilibrium report r and any
. Accordingly, the definition above applies the idea behind the D1 criterion on the restricted action space [ξ l (r) , ξ h (r)]. That is, it requires that for some out-of-equilibrium report r, if there some type t who would strictly prefer to deviate to r for any response a ∈ [ξ l (r) , ξ h (r)] that a type t = t would weakly prefer to deviate for, then upon observing the deviation r (coupled with any message), the Receiver should believe it is type t .
21 Actually, the test would be weaker than the D1 criterion. This is because D1 requires distinct types t1 and t 2 to both be pruned from the support of R's beliefs if there exist distinct t 1 and t 2 such that for i = 1, 2, A(r, t i ) ⊆ A(r, t i ). The current formulation does not require this; it only requires pruning if there is a single t that "covers" all t = t . For exactly the same reason, the mD1 test formulated here is weaker than Bernheim and Severinov's (2003) . However, it can be proved that the sets of refined equilibria in the current model are identical under either formulation. For the same reason, even though the formulation of the mD1 criterion I use is strictly speaking weaker than Bernheim and Severinov's (2003) , they are equivalent here.
The mD1 criterion obviously imposes a strong restriction on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs of the Receiver. However, this makes them particularly appealing, and strengthens the ensuing results about existence of such equilibria and their convergence. Moreover, it permits a tight characterization of a class of equilibria for any k > 0.
Remark 4. Not surprisingly, the mD1 criterion does not directly help restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes in the pure cheap talk game (i.e. when k = 0). To see this, consider an equilibrium when k = 0. Given that M is uncountable and k = 0, there is an essentially equivalent equilibrium (i.e.
one that induces the same outcome mapping from types to actions) where all types send the same report, call it r * , and use possibly different cheap talk messages. I claim that this equilibrium can be supported by strategies that satisfy mD1. As in CS, there can only be a finite number of actions induced in equilibrium when k = 0; hence the equilibrium can be supported with finitely many distinct cheap talk messages. Denote the highest and lowest actions induced in equilibrium form an equilibrium that supports the same outcome as the original equilibrium, and moreover the strategies satisfy report and belief monotonicity. To see that mD1 is satisfied, consider any r > r * (the argument is analogous for r < r * ). We have ξ l (r) = a h and ξ h (r) = a R (1), hence
. Since no type strictly prefers a h over what it elicits in equilibrium, mD1 is satisfied.
Characterization and Existence
For any report r, let t l (r) ≡ inf {t : ρ (t) = r} and t h (r) ≡ sup {t : ρ (t) = r}. (As usual, the dependence on the reporting strategy ρ is left implicit.) If there is pooling on r, then t l (r) < t h (r) and every type t ∈ (t l (r) , t h (r)) sends report r. It is important to note that within the set of types pooling on r, there may be some information conveyed via cheap talk messages, but just as in CS, cheap talk cannot induce any full separation within (t l (r), t h (r)).
The key step towards characterizing mD1 equilibria is the following Lemma. (ii) For all such r ∈ (r p , r p + θ (r p )), and any message m, α (r, m) = a R (t h (r p ));
Here is the intuition behind the result. Fix a report, r p < 1, that a set of types are pooling on. For this discussion, let t h be shorthand for t h (r p ), and assume for simplicity that ρ(t h ) = r p .
The first part of the Lemma follows from the fact that because it is pooling, type t h induces an action strictly smaller than a R (t h ). If ρ were continuous at t h , then types immediately above t h must be separating. Since the utility gain for t h from mimicking t h + ε is positive and bounded away from 0 as ε → 0, whereas any additional cost of reporting goes to 0, it follows that t h has a profitable deviation for small enough ε > 0; a contradiction. Now turn to the second part of the Lemma. The proof shows that the mD1 criterion requires the Receiver to play a R (t h ) in response to any report r ∈ (r p , r p + θ (r p )), regardless of the accompanying cheap talk message. To see how this works, let a − be the highest action elicited by any type in the pool on r p , and a + be the lowest action elicited in equilibrium by types above t h . If type t h would want to strictly deviate from its equilibrium play for every response a ∈ [a − , a + ] to report r that any other type t would want to weakly deviate for, then mD1 requires the Receiver to place probability 1 on t h upon seeing r. Consider some type t < t h (the logic is symmetric for t > t h ). In equilibrium, t induces an action weakly lower than that induced by t h , and weakly lower than a − . Moreover, t's preferred action and t's preferred report are both strictly lower than t h 's. The supermodularity of U (·, ·) and the submodularity of C(·, ·) imply that if t would weakly prefer to deviate to r for some response of the Receiver in [a − , a + ], then t h would strictly prefer to deviate.
The intuition is illustrated in Figure 2 , which is drawn with the specification k = 1,
, and V (a, t) = −(a − t) 2 . In the figure, the thick solid (red) line is the Sender's reporting strategy; the thick dotted (blue) line is the Receiver's strategy; and the thin solid (blue) curves are indifference curves for various types. Note that due to the quadratic specification, indifference curves are circles. The set of report-action pairs that type t 0 < t 1 would weakly prefer to deviate to (satisfying r ∈ (r p , θ(r p )) and a ∈ [a − , a + ]) is shaded with (green) stripes in one direction. The set of report-action pairs that type t 1 > t h would weakly prefer to deviate to (satisfying r ∈ (r p , θ(r p )) and a ∈ [a − , a + ]) is shaded with (orange) stripes in the other direction. Clearly, both these sets are strict subsets of the set of report-action pairs that type t h would weakly prefer to deviate to (satisfying r ∈ (r p , θ(r p )) and
Lemma 4 implies that in an mD1 equilibrium, there can only be pooling on the highest report. If there were pooling on some other report, r, then for small enough ε > 0, type t h (r) − ε would have a profitable deviation to a report r + ε, which by the Lemma must induce the response a R (t h ). This reveals the basic structure of any mD1 equilibrium: there could be an interval of separating types at the bottom end of the type space (separation must of course occur through distinct reports); whereafter all remaining types pool on r = 1, but may further segment themselves using cheap talk messages.
To characterize the separating region, consider the following differential equation: 
For any open interval of types that are separating, ρ must solve (DE). This is straightforward assuming differentiability of ρ, since in that case, ρ in (DE) is the solution to the first order condition for type t. Arguments extending those of Mailath (1987) 
establish that in fact conditions (i)-(iv) of the Lemma are necessary and sufficient for a "separating function". That the initial value must be ρ(0) = r S (0) is a consequence of Lemma 4 (part iii).
Henceforth, let ρ * and t denote the objects identified in Lemma 5.
Theorem 3. In any mD1 equilibrium, ((ρ, µ), α), there exists some t ∈ 0, t and a finite partition
22 Since C1(r S (t), t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1], there is no Lipschitz condition on ρ in (DE). Thus, standard results on the existence of solutions to differential equations do not apply.
(c.2) ∀m and ∀r ∈ r
Conversely, for any t ∈ 0, t and a finite partition of [t, 1] incurring the cost of report ρ * (t) (this is condition CIN, for cutoff indifference); (iii) if the cutoff type is 0 then type 0 weakly prefers being perceived as a member of [0, t 1 ] and incurring the cost of report 1 to separating itself and incurring the cost of report 0 (this is condition ZWP, for zero weak preference). All types below t separate themselves using the report strategy ρ * (t), whereas all types above t send report 1, but may further segment themselves into a partition of [t, 1] by using cheap talk messages as in CS. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of an mD1 equilibrium with a strictly positive cutoff type and two distinct cheap talk messages that can accompany report r = 1 in equilibrium. It is drawn for a case where a R (t) = r S (t) = t. The function ρ * is plotted as the solid thin (black) line, the equilibrium reporting strategy, ρ, is the solid thick (red) line, and the Receiver's strategy, α, is the dotted (blue) line. As stated in part (c.3) of the Theorem, all reports r ∈ (ρ * (t), 1) induce the action a R (t). There is segmentation within [t, 1] 
Convergence
Say that an outcome is an mD1 outcome if it can be supported by an mD1 equilibrium. The following result basically strengthens the conclusion of Theorem 2 in the current environment: it says that a CS equilibrium satisfying NITS is the limit of not just some sequence of monotone equilibria, but rather a sequence of mD1 equilibria. Proof. The second part is deferred to Appendix C. For the first part, fix a CS outcome, β 0 , that satisfies NITS strictly, and let the supporting partition of any generating equilibrium be
. The sufficiency part of Theorem 3 implies that for all k <k, there is an mD1 equilibrium with cutoff type t = 0 whose outcome is β 0 .
Q.E.D.
While there is no simple way to characterize exactly when there is a CS outcome that satisfies NITS but not NITS strictly, it is intuitive that if a triple of preferences and prior, (U, V, F ), is such that there is a CS outcome that satisfies NITS but not strictly, any small perturbation to either preferences or the prior will ensure that all CS outcomes satisfy NITS either strictly or not at all. 23 The following Corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5 and Lemma 3. 
Discussion
I have studied a model of communication between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver, where the Sender has a convex cost of misreporting his private information. Using a scalar to parameterize the importance of the lying cost, the pure cheap talk model of CS can be viewed as the limit of the costly lying games studied here. The main insight is that a CS equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of monotone equilibria as talk gets almost-cheap only if the CS equilibrium satisfies NITS, i.e. the lowest type weakly prefers the action elicited in the CS equilibrium to 23 For example, in the commonly applied uniform-quadratic setting with a single parameter b > 0 such that what it would get in the complete-information game. Under a regularity condition (Condition M), only the most-informative cheap talk equilibrium satisfies NITS. A converse result that there exists a sequence of monotone equilibria that converge to any CS equilibrium satisfying NITS was also derived under a mild technical assumption.
The results obtained here provide a novel justification for focussing on the most-informative equilibrium of CS (when regularity Condition M holds). They also indicate that little is lost by analyzing this equilibrium of the pure cheap talk game rather than studying the more complicated costly misreporting game, provided that the costs are small. On the other hand, when costs are large, there exist equilibria where significantly more information can be conveyed than in the case of pure cheap talk. Indeed, there may be a large regions of full separation when these costs are sufficiently large. I conclude by briefly discuss two broader aspects of the theory.
Inflated Reporting. In any mD1 equilibrium, all types-except possibly the endpoints, 0 and 1-use reports that are higher than what they would use in the absence of private information, r S (t). (See Lemma B.6 in the Appendix for a formal statement.) This is also the case for the monotone almost-cheap talk equilibria constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. In this sense, the equilibria I have studied feature inflated language. The underlying intuition is that every type would like to perceived as being larger than it truly is, and since higher types prefer higher reports, this leads to reporting strategies that are shifted up from the complete information benchmark. This is broadly consistent with documented evidence about strategic information transmission, e.g. analysts' stock recommendations (Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2004) , managers' reports about firm earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) , and laboratory experiments (Cai and Wang, 2006) .
A testable implication of the mD1 equilibria analysis is that over a large range of k (the scalar parameter of cost of misreporting), a decrease in k should lead to an increase in the degree of report inflation.
Despite the presence of language inflation in equilibrium, the Receiver, being fully strategic, is not systematically deceived in any way: in equilibrium, she correctly deflates the Sender's report so that her conditional expectation of the Sender's type given the report is in fact correct.
Indeed, the report inflation in an mD1 equilibrium is self-defeating in this sense, because almost all types of the Sender incur a cost from lying. As in CS, for many parameterizations such as the uniform-quadratic example, the Sender would prefer to commit himself ex-ante to telling the truth.
Behavioral Types and Naive Receivers. In addition to the motivations already given for the presence of misreporting costs, there is another that is less direct but arguably important: the Receiver may be naive or boundedly rational with some probability, as in Chen (2006), Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) , and Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) . 24 To be concrete, suppose that the report is in fact pure cheap talk, but with probability q ∈ (0, 1), the Receiver is especially naive and treats the report r as a recommendation of action, and just follows it by playing a = r; with probability 1 − q, the Receiver is strategic and plays a best response to the Sender's strategy. Then, for a type t Sender, the expected utility from sending report r and receiving the action a from a strategic Receiver (and mechanically, the action r if the Receiver is naive)
is: Π(a, r, t) ≡ (1 − q)U (a, t) + qU (r, t) . By setting k ≡ q 1−q and C(r, t) ≡ −U (r, t), this can be normalized and rewritten as Π(a, r, t) = U (a, t) − kC (r, t) , where C satisfies the assumptions of this paper, so long as the report space contains [a S (0), a S (1)]. As noted in Section 2, the analysis carries over with straightforward relabeling when the report space is any compact interval; hence, this naive Receiver specification is a special case of costly misreporting. 25 In fact, it requires only minor modifications to the arguments to show that that all the main results of this paper extend to cost functions of the form C(ν(r), t), where C is as before but ν is now any twice differentiable and strictly increasing function. The reason is that when ν is strictly increasing, the most-preferred report function, r S (t), is strictly increasing, which is the key to the analysis. This extension is useful because it allows embedding much richer behavioral types of Receivers. So long as we can represent the behavioral type's mechanical 
(ν(r), t) ≡ −U (ν(r), t).
For example, the behavioral type of Receiver may believe that the Sender is telling the truth, and hence play a R (r) upon hearing report. This is simply the case of ν(r) = a R (r). Perhaps the behavioral type of Receiver believes that the Sender of type t sends report a S (t)-as would be optimal for the Sender if he thought the Receiver would blindly follow his recommendation and take action r upon hearing report r-in which case the behavior type optimally plays a R • (a S ) −1 (r) in response to a report r. This translates via
The possibility of the Receiver being naive also circumvents the self-defeating nature of equilibrium lying. It is easy to verify that even in the uniform-quadratic example, the Sender may ex-ante prefer the equilibrium play over committing himself to truth-telling if the Receiver may be appropriate naive. In effect, the Sender and fully-rational Receiver exploit the presence of the naive Receiver.
Appendix A: Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2 on page 11. In proving the first two parts of the Lemma, the following notation will be useful. For any t, denote by γ(t) the type such that a S (γ(t)) = a R (t) if it exists, or else let γ(t) = 0. Clearly, if t > 0, γ(t) < t.
(i) It suffices to show that no t > 0 can be separating when k is sufficiently small. Pick anyt > 0, and suppose there is an equilibrium, (ρ k , α k ), supporting outcome β k wheret is separating. I will argue to a contradiction when k is sufficiently small. Sincet is separating, report monotonicity implies that
γ(t) .
But the right hand side of this inequality is converging to 0 as k → 0 because C(·, ·) is bounded, whereas the left hand side is bounded below by the strictly positive constant U a R t , γ(t) − U a R (γ(t),t), γ(t) ; thus the inequality fails for small enough k.
(ii) Fix ε > 0. Suppose there is an equilibrium, (ρ k , α k ), supporting outcome β k , where
is infinite. I will argue to a contradiction when k is sufficiently small. By part (i), when k is sufficiently small, ever type above ε is part of a non-singleton convex pool. Without loss of generality, assume that the infimum of types in a pool is part of the pool. A k can be infinite only if there are arbitrarily small pools within the truncated type space [ε, 1] . It follows that for any θ > 0, there exists at k (θ) > ε sucĥ t k (θ) is the lowest type amongst the set of types it pools with, and if some type t pools witht
The following ordering obtains:
The right hand side of (A-1) is converging to 0 as k → 0 (because C(·, ·) is bounded). On the other hand, by picking θ small enough, the left hand side of (A-1) can be bounded below by a strictly positive constant because min t≥ε U a R (t) , γ(t) − U a R (γ(t), t), γ(t) > 0, and by picking θ sufficiently small, β k t k (θ) − a R t k (θ) can be made as small as desired (uniformly over k). Therefore, (A-1) fails for small enough k. 
This is a system of N (k) − 1 equations. As k → 0, the right hand side converges to 0, since C(·, ·) is bounded. Moreover, τ k N (k) ≡ 1, and as already noted, τ k 0 → 0 as k → 0. By inspection against the CS equilibrium conditions (t 0 ≡ 0, t N ≡ 1, and equations (A)), for any sufficiently small k, there must be an N (k)-step CS equilibrium partition,
Proof of Theorem 2 on page 16. I fill in the details here for the Claims in the proof sketch provided in the text. (1) . For all such k, report monotonicity implies that r S (1) is unused in equilibrium, and belief monotonicity implies that α 
It is straightforward to verify that equilibrium requires type t k n to be indifferent between "pooling up or down", i.e. U (a 
, and hence t k n has a profitable deviation, a contradiction. Proof of Claim 4: Suppose this were not true, i.e. there exists k arbitrarily small such that r k 1 > r S (0). For all such k, report monotonicity implies that r S (0) is unused in equilibrium, and belief monotonicity implies that α(r
(applying continuity of U , U 11 < 0, and the hypothesis that
, and hence type 0 has a profitable deviation, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The following definitions and Lemma are needed to prove Theorem 2. Define for any ε ≥ 0, the following modified arbitrage condition for any sequence t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t J :
For any ε ≥ 0 and any t ∈ [0, 1], define t; ε) , . . . , τ K(t;ε) (t; ε) ≤ 1 denote a sequence of length K(t; ε) that satisfies (A-2). Note that for any K (t; ε) ≥ j > 1, τ j (t; ε) > τ j−1 (t; ε); also, τ (t; ε) is a partition if and only if τ K(t;ε) (t; ε) = 1. 
Proof. Fix δ > 0, ε > 0, and the non-decreasing sequence t (0, ε) . By the same arguments as in CS Theorem 1, K(·; ε) changes by one at any point of discontinuity, and by the continuity of solutions to (A-2) in initial conditions, K(·; ε) is discontinuous at t only if τ (t; ε) is a partition. Similarly, K(t; ·) changes by one at any point of discontinuity, and is discontinuous at ε only if τ (t; ε) is a partition. The continuity of solutions to (A-2) in ε and initial conditions implies that there existδ ∈ 0, δ andε
0) for all t small enough. I now consider two exhaustive cases.
By continuity, the left hand side above converges to 0 as (t, ε) → t 0 1 , 0 , hence for (t, ε) close enough to t
For any such (t, ε), the partition τ (t; ε) satisfies the requisite properties.
Case 2: K (t; ε t ) = N for some t, ε t ∈ B t 0 1 ;δ,ε . If K (t; ·) has a discontinuity at any ε < ε t , then τ (t, ε) satisfies the requisite properties; so suppose that K (t; ε) = N for all ε ∈ (0, ε t ]. Pick any t ,ε ∈ B t 0 1 ;δ,ε such that K(t; 0) = N − 1 and τ N −1 (t; ε) < 1 for all ε ∈ (0,ε); such a t ,ε exists by Assumption 1 and the continuity of solutions to (A-2) in initial conditions. For any ε < min {ε t ,ε}, K (·; ε) has a discontinuity at some t ε ∈ min t,t , max t,t . For any ε < min {ε t ,ε} , τ (t ε ; ε) is a partition satisfying the requisite properties.
Proof of Theorem 2 on page 16. For any CS outcome satisfying NITS, I will construct a sequence of monotone outcomes that converge to it in measure. Specifically, let the CS outcome β 0 satisfy NITS with partition t 
Without loss of generality, assume that δ is small enough such that U a R 0, t
. . , N − 1. First I will define the reports that will be used on the equilibrium path, starting from the upper end of the type space and proceeding inductively. Initialize r N = 1. To define r j for j = 1, . . . , N −1, assume inductively that r j+1 > r S (t j ) has been defined, and then define r j ∈ (r S (t j ), r j+1 ) as the solution to
, r j+1 ) as long as ε j is strictly positive and small enough. Therefore, Lemma A.1 implies that for any k > 0, there is a partition t 0 ≡ 0, t 1 , . . . , t N ≡ 1 and a strictly increasing sequence of reports
, and (A-3) holds. To complete the description of equilibrium, set ρ(0) = r 1 and for each j = 1, . . . , N , set every t ∈ (t j−1 , t j ] to play ρ(t) = r j . For all on-the-path reports r j , let α(r j ) = a R (t j−1 , t j ). For off-the-path reports r < r 1 , set α(r) = a R (0), for off-path r > r N set α(r) = a R (t N −1 , t N ), and for any other off-path report r ∈ (r j , r j+1 ) with j = 1, . . . , N − 1, set α(r) = a R (t j−1 , t j ). The appropriate belief specification, consistent with Bayes rule, are easy to construct, hence suppressed.
It remains to prove that this construction is a monotone equilibrium. It is obvious that message and belief monotonicity hold, and that the Receiver is playing optimally. To check Sender optimality, make the following three observations:
1. there are no off-the-equilibrium path reports at the top, since r N = 1.
2. for any j = 1, . . . , N − 1, type t j is indifferent between sending reports r j and r j+1 , and moreover, strictly prefers sending r j to any r ∈ (r j , r j+1 ) because any such r costs more (r j > r S (t j )) and elicits the same action as r j .
3. since k < k δ and t 1 < t 0 1 + δ, the lowest type strictly prefers sending r 1 and eliciting a R (0, t 1 ) to sending any report r < r 1 and eliciting a R (0).
These three facts are sufficient to prove optimality for the Sender, following the arguments for which types have the "biggest incentive to deviate to any unused report" used in the characterization of mD1 equilibria, Lemmas B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B. Specifically, it is clear from the construction that there are no profitable deviations to on-path reports. Lemma B.2 implies that if any type has an incentive to deviate to an unused report r ∈ (r j , r j+1 ) for some j = 1, . . . , N − 1, then type t j also has the incentive; but as noted in point 2 above, type t j does not have such an incentive. Lemma B.3 implies that if any type has an incentive to deviate to an unused report r < r 1 , then type 0 also has the incentive; but as noted in point 3 above, type 0 does not have such an incentive.
Case 2: Now suppose that the CS outcome satisfies NITS with equality, so that U (a R (0, t
. It suffices to show that for any δ > 0, there exists
For any k > 0, let δ k be the smaller of δ and the solution to U a 
, and (A-3) holds. Given these objects, monotone strategies are described analogous to earlier. That this construction is an equilibrium is verified as before, with the only change that step 3 (the lowest type strictly prefers sending r 1 and eliciting a R (0, t 1 ) to sending any report r < r 1 and eliciting a R (0)) follows from the fact thatt 1 < δ k .
Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Steps to Characterizing mD1 Equilibria
This Appendix lays out a series of lemmata that are needed to prove the results in Section 4.
Let σ be shorthand for the tuple (ρ, µ);
I start with two simple observations about any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α). Fix any r. First, the set of types using r (i.e. T (r)) must be convex (this follows from report monotonicity); second, there must be a finite partition of the set of types using r into connected non-degenerate intervals, 26 such that all the types in an element of the partition must use the same cheap talk message. This latter point is simply the logic of CS holding the report, r, fixed. An implication that will be extensively used is that for any (r, m), T (r, m) must be convex, and moreover |T (r, m)| ∈ {0, 1, ∞}. Note that there is pooling on some r if and only if |T (r)| > 1; r is unused if and only if |T (r)| = 0; and a type t is separating if and only if |T (σ(t))| = 1.
Lemma B.1. In any equilibrium, (σ, α), if there pooling on some r p < 1, then there exists θ(r p ) > 0 such any r ∈ (r p , b p + θ(r p )) is unused.
Proof. Suppose there is pooling on r p < 1. As shorthand, write t h instead of t h (r p ). If ρ (t h ) > r p , then by report monotonicity, we are done, since reports in (r p , ρ (t h )) are unused. So assume that ρ (t h ) = r p . If t h = 1, then we are done, since reports r ∈ (r p , 1) are unused. So assume t h < 1. Let m h ≡ µ (t h ).
Proof: If not, type t h is separating. But then, for small enough ε > 0, some type t h − ε would prefer to mimic type t h , contradicting equilibrium.
It follows that
(ρ is well-defined by report monotonicity, though it may not be played in equilibrium.)
Claim: ρ > r p .
Proof: Suppose not. By report monotonicity, it must be that ρ = r p = ρ (t h ). Note that ρ is then continuous at t h . Since ρ (t) > r p for all t > t h , it follows that ρ is strictly increasing on (t h , t h + δ) for some δ > 0. Hence, defining a ε ≡ α (σ (t h + ε)), we have a ε = a R (t h + ε) for small enough ε > 0. By picking ε > 0 small enough, we can make C (ρ (t h + ε) , t h ) − C (r p , t h ) arbitrarily close to 0, whereas U (a ε , t h ) − U (α (r p , m h ) , t h ) is positive and bounded away from 0, because α (r p , m h ) < a R (t h ) < a ε < a S (t h ). Therefore, for small enough ε > 0, t h prefers to imitate t h + ε, contradicting equilibrium.
This completes the argument because reports in (r p , ρ ) are unused.
Q.E.D.
Lemma B.2. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α), if |T (r)| = 0 for some r > ρ(0), then for any m, α(r, m) = a R (sup{t : ρ(t) ≤ r}). α(σ(t) ). There are two distinct cases: eithert < 1, ort = 1.
, and a − ≡ ξ l (r).
Claim: The inequalities below, (B-1) and (B-2), hold for all t, with equality for t =t:
Proof: I prove it for (B-1); it is analogous for (B-2). Suppose first that ρ(t) >r.
) Continuity of U and C imply that any t for which (B-1) does not hold has a profitable deviation to σ(t − ε) for small enough ε > 0. For typet, suppose towards contradiction that (B-1) holds strictly. Continuity of U and C then imply that for all sufficiently small ε > 0, U at,t − ε − kC ρ t ,t − ε > U at −ε ,t − ε − kC ρ(t − ε),t − ε , which contradicts optimality of σ(t − ε). Now suppose that ρ(t) <r. Then a − = at and r − = ρ(t), and it is trivial that (B-1) holds with equality fort. Moreover, any t for which (B-1) does not hold has a profitable deviation to σ(t).
Claim: For all m, α (r, m) = a R t .
Proof: It suffices to show that A(r,t) = ∅ and for all t =t, A(r, t) ⊆ A(r, 1). Consider the first item. By the previous Claim, (r,t) . In either case, A(r,t) = ∅. Now turn to the second item. I must show that ∀a ∈ [a − , a + ] and ∀t =t,
I provide the argument for t <t; it is analogous for t > t h (using (B-2)) instead of (B-1)). Since (B-1) holds for all t, and with equality fort, it suffices to show that
This is true if
which can be be rewritten as
which is true because U 12 > 0 > C 12 .
Case 2:t = 1
It needs to be shown that for all m, α(r, m) = a R (1) . If a 1 = a R (1), this is a trivial consequence of belief monotonicity, so assume henceforth that a 1 < a R (1) . If ρ (1) >r, then the same proof as in Case 1 works, except that one now defines r + ≡ ρ (1). So consider ρ (1) <r. Then a − = a 1 and a + = a R (1) .
Claim: For all t < 1, A(r, t) ⊆ A(r, 1).
Proof: I must show that ∀a ∈ a 1 , a (1), t) , it suffices to show that for all t < 1,
which can be rewritten as
This inequality holds because C 12 < 0 < U 12 . Now observe that ifr is sufficiently close to ρ (1) , then a R (1) ∈ A(r, 1), and we are done because A(r, 1) = ∅. But then, belief monotonicity implies the result even ifr is larger.
Proof. To avoid trivialities, assume r S (0) < ρ(0). Pick anyr ∈ [r S (0), ρ (0)) and any m. For any t, let a t ≡ α(σ(t)). Then ξ l (r) = a R (0) and ξ h (r) = a 0 .
Claim: A(r, 0) = ∅.
Proof: Sincer > r S (0), a 0 ∈ A(r, 0).
Claim: For all t > 0, A(r, t) ⊆ A(r, 0).
Proof: It suffices to show that ∀a ∈ a
and hence it suffices to show that
This inequality can be rewritten as
which holds because C 12 < 0 < U 12 .
Lemma B.4. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α), 
Proof. Given part (i), parts (ii) and (iii) are straightforward applications of the CS arguments, hence omitted. For part (i), suppose to the contrary that is some r p < 1 with
By Lemma B.1, ∃θ > 0 such that for any r ∈ (r p , r p + θ), |T (r)| = 0. By Lemma B.2, for any r ∈ (r p , r p + θ) and any m, α(r, m) = a R (t h (r p )). It follows that for small enough ε > 0 and δ > 0, a type t h (r p ) − ε strictly prefers to report r p + δ and induce a R (t h (r p )) rather than play σ(t h (r p ) − ε) and induceâ, a contradiction.
Lemma B.5. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α) with cutoff t = 0, ρ (0) ∈ {r S (0), 1}.
Proof. Assume t = 0 and ρ(0) = 1. Note that type 0 is thus separating. I will argue that ρ(0) = r S (0) via two Claims.
, type 0 has a profitable deviation, a contradiction.
Proof: Suppose ρ(0) < r S (0). Letâ ≡ lim ε↓0 α(σ(ε)) (this is the lowest action elicited by the types just above 0). It is straightforward that U (â, 0) − kC (1, 0) 
, because otherwise, a small enough type ε > 0 would have a profitable deviation to ρ(0). Pick an arbitrary m. Observe that by belief monotonicity, α(r (1, 0) . Therefore, type 0 has a profitable deviation, a contradiction.
Lemma B.6. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α) with cutoff t, ρ (t) > r S (t) for all t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The result is trivial for all t ∈ (t, 1), since ρ(t) = 1 > r S (t) for all types. So it suffices to assume that t > 0 and prove the Lemma for t ∈ (0, t]. The proof is via three Claims.
Claim: Ift > 0 is such that all types in [0,t] are separating, then ρ(t) = r S (t).
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. suppose that there exists at > 0 such that all types in [0,t] are separating and yet ρ(t) = r S (t). For small ε ≥ 0, define g (ε) as the expected utility gain for a typet − ε by deviating from ρ t − ε to ρ t . Since we are on a separating portion of the type space,
Differentiating yields
Clearly, φ is continuous, and since
implying that a typet − ε strictly prefers to imitatê t, contradicting equilibrium separation oft.
Claim: ρ(t) > r S (t) for all t ∈ (0, t).
Proof: Suppose the result is not true. By the first Claim, it must be that there exists a t ∈ (0, t) such that ρ (t ) < r S (t ). By report monotonicity, ρ (t − ε) < ρ (t ) for all ε > 0. It follows that for small enough ε > 0, C (ρ (t − ε) , t − ε) > C (ρ (t ) , t − ε). On the other hand, since we are on the separating part of the type space, for small enough ε > 0, U a R (t ) , t − ε > U a R (t − ε) , t − ε . Therefore, for small enough ε > 0, a type t − ε strictly prefers to imitate t , contradicting equilibrium separation of t .
Claim: ρ(t) > r S (t).
Proof: If ρ(t) = 1, the result is true because r S (t) < 1 (since t < 1). So suppose ρ(t) < 1. In this case, t is separating. By the first Claim, ρ(t) = r S (t). Report monotonicity, continuity of r S , and ρ (t) > r S (t) for all t ∈ (0, t) then imply that ρ (t) > r S (t).
Q.E.D.
Lemma B.7. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α), with cutoff t,
(ii) if t > 0, then ρ is either right-or left-continuous at t;
Proof. (i) Trivially, ρ is continuous above t, since ρ(t) = 1 for all t > t. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a discontinuity at some t < t. First assume ρ (t ) < lim t↓t ρ (t) ≡ ρ. By the continuity of C and the monotonicity of ρ, as ε ↓ 0,
where the inequality above follows from ρ > ρ (t ) ≥ r S (t ) (the weak inequality here coming from Lemma B.6). On the other hand, U a R (t + ε) , t + ε − U a R (t ) , t + ε → 0; hence, for small enough ε > 0, t + ε prefers to imitate t , contradicting equilibrium separation.
The argument for the other case where ρ (t ) > lim t↑t ρ (t) is similar, establishing that t prefers to imitate t − ε for small enough ε > 0.
(ii) Suppose not. If t = 1, t is separating because all types below t are separating. If t < 1, t is separating because ρ is not right-continuous at t. Since ρ is not left-continuous at t, report monotonicity implies ρ (t) > lim t↑t ρ (t) ≡ ρ. Since for all t ∈ (0, t), ρ(t) is continuous (by part (i) of this Lemma) and ρ(t) > r S (t) (by Lemma B.6), we have ρ ≥ r S (t). Since t is separating, it must be that for all ε > 0,
Since lim ε↓0 ρ (t − ε) = ρ, the left hand side of (B-3) is converging to U a
Lemma B.8. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α) with cutoff t, let r 1 ≡ lim t↑t ρ (t) and m 1 ≡ lim t↓t µ (t).
27
Then,
Proof. (i)
Assume t ∈ (0, 1). Fist consider r 1 = 1. Then type t plays (1, m 1 ) and elicits α(1, m 1 ). Since all types below t are separating, equilibrium requires that for all ε > 0,
The Lemma follows from the above inequality, the continuity of U , C, a R , and r 1 = 1 = lim t↑t ρ (t).
So assume r 1 < 1. By Lemma B.7, either ρ (t) = r 1 or ρ (t) = 1. Suppose first ρ (t) = r 1 , in which case t is separating. Define for ε ≥ 0,
If the Lemma does not hold, W (0) > 0 (the reverse inequality is inconsistent with optimality of σ(t)). But then, by continuity of W , for small enough ε > 0, a type t + ε would prefer to imitate t by playing σ(t) rather than pool on (1, m 1 ), contradicting equilibrium.
It remains to consider ρ (t) = 1, in which case t is pooling. Note that in this case µ (t) = m 1 . Lemma B.2 implies that for all m, α(r 1 , m) = a R (t). Thus, if the Lemma does not hold, optimality of 27 These are well-defined respectively when t > 0 and t < 1.
But then, by continuity of U , C, and a R , and the fact that r 1 = lim t↑t ρ (t), we have that that for small enough ε > 0,
implying that a type t−ε prefers pooling on (1, m 1 ) rather than separating, contradicting optimality of its equilibrium play.
(ii) Assume t = 0. Suppose first ρ(0) = 1. Then α(σ(0)) = α(1, m 1 ), and by Lemma B.3, for any m, α(r S (0), m) = a R (0). The desired result now follows from from optimality of σ(0). So consider ρ(0) < 1. By Lemma B.5, type 0 is separating with ρ(0) = r S (0). I claim that type 0 must be indifferent between (1, m 1 ) and σ(0), which is sufficient to prove the Lemma. If this were not true, then optimality of (1, 0) . By continuity of U and C, for small enough ε > 0, a type ε has a profitable deviation to σ(0), contradicting equilibrium.
Lemma B.9. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α), with cutoff t, ρ(t) = ρ * (t) for all t < t.
Proof. The Lemma is vacuously true if t = 0, so assume that t > 0. Note that since there is separation below t, ρ must be strictly increasing on [0, t). 
; hence type 0 has a profitable deviation to ρ(ε).
Claim: ρ is differentiable on (0, t).
Proof: By Lemma B.7 and Lemma B.6, for all t ∈ (0, t), ρ(t) > r S (t) and ρ is continuous at t. Given these two facts, differentiability follows from the argument of Mailath (1987, Proposition 2 in Appendix).
Since ρ is differentiable on (0, t), it must satisfy the first order condition for optimality and thus solve (DE) there. Lemma B.7 implies that ρ must be also be continuous on [0, t). The proof is completed by noting that as proved in Lemma 5, ρ * is the unique strictly increasing function that satisfies these properties.
Lemma B.10. In any mD1 equilibrium, (σ, α), with cutoff t, ∀m and ∀r ∈ 0, r
Proof. It suffices to prove that there exists an m such that α(r S (0), m) = a R (0), since the result then follows from belief monotonicity. Suppose first that t > 0. Then type 0 is separating with ρ(0) = r S (0) (by Lemma B.9), hence α(r
Proof of Lemma 5 on page 22. As noted in the text, standard results do not apply because of the lack of Lipschitz condition on the relevant domain. Thus, I proceed as follows, similar to Mailath (1987) .
Step 1: Local existence. Consider the inverse initial value problem to find τ (r) such that: Step 2: The unique extension. To prove that there is a unique t and a unique extension ofρ from [0,t) to 0, t such that either t = 1 orρ(t) = 1, it is sufficient to prove the following inductive step: given the solutionρ ∈ C 1 ([0, δ)) withρ > 0, if lim t↑δρ (t) < 1, then there is a unique extension ofρ to [0, δ + θ) for some θ > 0, while maintainingρ > 0 andρ ∈ C 1 ([0, δ + θ)). To see that this is sufficient, observe that there must be some t ≤ 1 that is the supremum over all t such thatρ can be extended to [0, t) ⊆ [0, 1]. If t = 1, we are done by settingρ(t) = lim t↑1ρ (t) ≤ 1. If t < 1 thenρ cannot be extended to 0, t + ν for any ν > 0, which by the inductive step implies that lim t↑t ρ (t) = 1. We are done by setting ρ(t) = lim t↑tρ (t) = 1. In either case,ρ ∈ C 1 ([0, t] ).
It remains to prove the inductive step. Supposeρ is a solution to (DE) on [0, δ), withρ ∈ C 1 ([0, δ)) andρ > 0. Let r δ ≡ lim t↑δρ (t).
Claim: r δ > r S (δ).
Proof: Suppose not, towards contradiction. Then r δ = r S (δ) (becauseρ(t) > r S (t) for all t ∈ (0, δ)) and lim t↑δρ (t) = ∞. Let b ≡ max r Given the Claim, if r δ < 1, U 1 (a R (t),t)a R 1 (t) kC 1 (r,t) is continuous, Lipschitz, and bounded in a neighborhood of (δ, r δ ). Standard extension theorems (e.g. Coddington and Levinson, 1955, Theorem 4.1 and preceeding dicussion, p. 15) imply that if r δ < 1, there is a unique extension ofρ to [0, δ + θ) for some θ > 0; this 28 C 1 ([a, b) ) is the set of all functions on [a, b) that have continuous derivatives at all t ∈ (a, b) and in addition have a right-hand derivative at a that is continuous from the right at a. The obvious analogue applies to C 1 ([a, b] 
U (ψ(r), t) − kC(r, t).
Suppose to the contrary that for somet < t,r ∈ [ρ(0), ρ(t)] \ {ρ(t)} is a maximizer of the above expression, and lett ≡ ρ −1 (r). The first order condition fort and evaluating (DE) att imply U 1 (ψ(r),t)ψ (r) − kC 1 (r,t) = 0 = U 1 (ψ(r),t)ψ (r) − kC 1 (r,t).
But this is a contradiction because U 12 > 0 > C 12 implies that U 1 (ψ(r), t)ψ (r) − kC 1 (r, t) is strictly increasing in t.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4 on page 23. If t = 1, there is an mD1 equilibrium where all types separate by playing ρ * (t), so assume that t < 1. The proof is constructive.
Step 0: Preliminaries
Start by defining the function
φ (t) is the gain for type t from sending the highest report and receiving its ideal action over separating itself (thus inducing a R (t)) with report ρ * (t). Note that in equilibrium, the gain from pooling over separating can be no more than φ (t), and will generally be strictly less. There are two conceptually distinct cases: one where φ (t) = 0 for some t ≤ t, and the other where φ (t) > 0 for all t ≤ t. Definê t ≡ 0 if φ (t) > 0 for all t ≤ t sup t∈ [0,t] {t : φ (t) = 0} otherwise.
φ is continuous and φ t > 0; hencet < t and for all t ∈ t , t , φ(t) > 0. In everything that follows, we are only concerned with t ∈ t , t . So statements such as "for all t" are to be read as "for all t ∈ [t, t]" and so forth unless explicitly specified otherwise.
Step 1: Constructing the necessary sequences. Clearly, ∆ is continuous in both arguments, and strictly concave in a with a maximum at a S (t). Since ∆ a R (t) , t ≤ 0 ≤ ∆ a S (t) , t for all t ∈ t , t , it follows that for any such t, in the domain a ∈ a R (t) , a S (t) there exists a unique solution to ∆ (a, t) = 0. , and U 11 < 0. Given any t ∈ [0, 1], define τ 0 (t) = 0, τ 1 (t) = t, and recursively, for j ≥ 2, τ j (t) as the solution to U a R (τ j−1 (t) , τ j (t)) , τ j−1 (t) − U a R (τ j−2 (t) , τ j−1 (t)) , τ j−1 (t) = 0 if a solution exists that is strictly greater than τ j−1 (t), and otherwise set τ j (t) = 1. It is straightforward that for all j ≥ 0, τ j (t) is continuous in t. Finally, the second statement of the Theorem follows from the above by noting thatt > 0 for all k large enough, because φ(0) < 0 for all k large enough.
Proof of Theorem 5 on page Page 25. The first part of the Theorem was proved in the text. It remains to show the second part. Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2007) show that under Condition M, there is exactly one CS outcome that satisfies NITS. Denote this CS outcome β 0 , with partition t In any mD1 equilibrium, the cutoff type must be t k > 0, because if not, types are segmenting just as in some CS equilibrium, and type 0 would have a strict incentive to deviate to r = r S (0), since no CS equilibrium satisfies NITS strictly. It is easy to verify from (DE) that t k → 0 as k → 0. Consequently, in any sequence of mD1 equilibria as k → 0, t k → 0. Moreover, letting t k j denote the j th boundary type of the mD1 equilibrium,
Hence, by continuity of U and C, t k → 0, and U (a R (0), 0) = U (a R (0, t 
